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CURRENT ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL
PRICE AND INCOME POLICY
by

Jay C. Andersen

CURRENT ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL
PRICE AND INCOME POLICY
by Jay C. Anderse~l!
Many farmers and ranchers are now facing severe financial stress.
Since 1974, farm prices have been seriously disadvantageous to farmers.
Recently attention has been focused on the problem primarily by the
American Agriculture Movement.

In this paper, we accept the premise that

farm prices are unacceptably low.

There seems to be some sentiment to

come to the aid of farmers, but hard decisions must be made in the face of
lack of information and a lot of misinformation.
Goals of Farm Policy
In the past, agricultural policy has been dictated too much by the
political emergencies of the moment.
approach is urgently needed.

A longer-term, more consistent

As a beginning, we assert that there are

several legitimate goals of farm policy.

Among appropriate goals and

purposes are at least the f011owing:~
1.

Abundant supplies and reasonable prices to consumer.

nation we want to perpetuate the great legacy of abundance
here.

Surely as a

t~at

we enjoy

The vast productivity of agriculture has given us this invaluable

liprofessor and Head, Department of Economics, Utah State University,
Logan, Utah.

Y~1any of these are mentioned in Brandow, G. E.. IIIssues in Food
and Agricultural Policy--An Evaluation of Policy Instruments
Paper presented at National Public Policy Education Conference, Zion Illinois,
September 15, 1976. As Brandow notes, some of these are conflicting, and
opposing views arise.
ll

,

l,
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position.

Farm productivity has released the manpower and other resources

from the farms so that we can enjoy the fruits of resource Lise in nonfarm pursuits.
2.

Stability of market supplies and prices.

The extreme sensitivity

of agricultural markets to sh i fts in supply and demand has led to risk and
loss to producers, dissatisfaction of consumers, and reduced efficiency in
farming and the food industry.
to markets for food.

A reasonable task is to bring more stability

It is reasonable to insulate from shor t-term swings

in supplies or demands, but not possible or desirable to ma · ntain IInormalll
prices only by use of storage plans in the face of long-term burgeoning
surpluses or enduring scarcity.
3.

Income enhancement for farmers.

There seems to be some sentiment

for helping farmers in their plight of low returns to their resources used
in production.

The question is complicated by some producers doing very

well because of their great efficiency or low debt position or other factors, while many other farmers are for various reasons in danger of losing
their equity.

Serious arguments arise with respect to measures that would

enhance the position of large vs. small producers and vice versa.
4.

Low cost for government agricultural programs.

PaJ~ents,

food

stamps, administrative costs, and other items may be a cons i derable burden
on taxpayers.

Added inflation may result.

Most everyone would agree on

the desirability of minimizing government costs.
5.

Preservation of freedom of choice.

The matter of 'individ ual free-

dom to respond to incentives and the option to choose among alternative
courses of action are fundamental issues.

Certainly, economists use as a

model of efficiency the notion of perfect competition.

Whi'le this is an

abstraction that does not really exist, it is true that encumbrances or

- - - - - .-----
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departures from perfect competition on the part of individual entrepreneurs reduce the efficiency of the economic system.
6.

Aid to poor countries.

Most Americans find it acceptable and

desirable to share the abundance they have with less fortun3te people.
The more difficult question is how this is to be accomplished.

Is it by

donations or subsidized sale, providing expertise to enhance their own
system, or by direct financial aid to these people with whi ch they can
buy food or other items?
7.

Expansion of foreign markets.

The United States has had a balance

of payments problem, especially since the large oil imports have become
commonplace.

Export of agricultural commodities has been a major off-

setting factor.

Farmers and the nat ion in total have a stake in market

expansion.
8.

Provision of a storehouse for emergencies.

It wou l d seem that as

rich as we are and as capable as we are of producing large quantities that
this nation can well afford to stockpile more than a few weeks' of basic
commodities.

We have tended t o view these as burdensome in the past, and

their existence has depressed prices.

Perhaps an attitudinal change is

required to view a larger carryover as being desirable.

Thct which is

undesirable is continued build-up after an adequate storeho se is achieved.
A storehouse is certainly consistent with stability; but, as it has been
viewed in the past, it has been a serious depressant on commodity prices.
9.

Minimal adverse impact of commodity programs on other commodity

producers.

It is well known that high-feed grain prices are undesirable

for livestock feeders, at least in the short run.

It is essential that one

program does not disrupt and throw other programs into disarray.

4

The Farm Problem
In its simplest form, the problem of unacceptable farm commod -ity
prices is a problem of excess supply.

Frequently, it has been asserted

that the laws of supply and demand are no longer working.
case.

Such is not the

The results of the working of the laws are distasteful to some, but

the system is working.
Consider the following simple characterization of workings of supply
and demand in Figure 1.

Assume that price pp is deemed appropriate and

acceptable as a goal for a particular commodity.

Demand is depicted by

~O,

which indicates that as prices decrease, the quantity taken by consumers
will increase.

Supply is SS, which suggests that as price rises or as

price is expected to rise, producers come forth with a larger quantity of
production.

Supply and demand intersect such that price is P1 and quantity
produced is Ql. Unfortunately, price Pl is well bel ow the accepted goal.

o

s
P

p

o

o
Figure 1.

Supply and Oemand--Showing resul ting price and quantity as well
as price goal.
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The reason for the country's achieving the excess supply capacity is
because of the vast productivity associated with improvement in technology.
Seed, fertilizer, irrigation, better tillage through mechanization and
other related factors have thrust American agriculture into a situation not
common to other countries of the world.

Efficient producers can continue

to improve and lower costs of production to add to the capac i ty of the
system.

There are ineffective brakes on this giant machine since producers

have no option but to continue to produce even more to try to cover at
least the out-of-pocket costs of production.

There may be "little or no

income left over to cover fixed costs such as is incurred by ownership of
land or for other costs already sunk.
takes place or not.
economy.

These costs go on whether production

Thus, fa rm producers are unlike other sectors of the

It would be foolish to expect farm machinery

maket~s

to build so

much machinery that prices fall and machinery manufacturers produce themselves into bankruptcy.
not.

Most sectors have such control.

Agriculture does

Because of this difference, many would justify some pY'ogram to

stabilize and support agricul t ure.
Frequently, we have heard that farmers are producing their goods at
below the cost of production.

This has several possible interpretations,

depending on which factors are included and whether we are talking about
the most efficient or least efficient producers.
It is a misconception to suppose that a single figure on cost of production is applicable.

There are as many situations as there are farmers.

In general, cost of production might be characterized as i n Figure 2.
dot on the graph represents the average cost of production for a given
farmer for a specific commodity for a particular year.

Of course, in

reality there are many more producers than dots on the graph.

Each
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Figure 2.

Average cost of production related to size of enterprise.

There are many factors which affect costs, certainly size of enterprise is one of them.
the line LAC.

The general re l ationship can be char acterized as

Let us assume that the average cost value for all of these

individuals is Cl . At this point, about one-half of the producers can
produce at a cost less than the average and one-half only at more than
average.

If it happened that the sale price was exactly at the average of

all producers' costs , some would make money and some would l ose.

Some

would want to increase their pusiness because of t he high profit potential
and others would want to get out of the business or make some other change
because they were losing money.

The important thing is that any reasonable

sale price will make some rich and some will become poor.

If the price is

high, more will become rich; -if it is low, more will become poor.

If sale

price is established at a high level, then there are powerful incentives
for many to increase production by many and diverse means.
can be monitored and controlled while others cannot.

Some of these

7

A cost of production index has been mentioned as a basis for some
kind of support or target price.

With all of the problems mentioned

above, it is perhaps worthwhile to list some standard data f or a few
areas.

The Department of Economics, Utah State University, has a set of

cost data foy' 1977 (see Table 1) for selected crops in Utah. 1I The data
from U.S. Department of Agriculture indicates that farm cos' s have been
inflating at a rate of 7.6 percent per year from 1967 to 19J7. Y Assume
an 8 percent increase to bring these values to a 1978 projected cost
level.

These values are found in the first five columns of Table 1.

In the last three columns of Table 1, the additional cost of paying
for land is included.
is difficult.

The problem of whether or not to inc l ude this item

There is evidence that the imputed rate of return on land

is only 2 or 3 percent.
percent per year.

But land prices continue to inflate by 8 to 10

There are various reasons cited for this , which range

from foreign conspiracies to take over our country

(which vie think is not

credible), to a sense of agricultural fundamentalism wherein people, who
can afford land,. buy it as a consumption good.

That i s, some derive a

sense of good from owning land, even if it costs them.

There are some tax

treatments, both foreign and domestic, that provide some incentive to hold
land.

But we assert that the main reason that people conti nue to buy land

and bid up prices is that they have an expectation of making a profit.

For

many, the profit can only be realized by a resale since the direct returns
to farming land or renting it out remain low.
lIDavis, Lynn H., Stuart H. Richards, and Rondo A. Christensen.
IIEnterprise Budgets for Farm and Ranch Planning in Utah
Economics Research
Institute, Study Paper #77-7, Utah State University, August 1977, 13 pp.
ll

,

il U. s . Department of Agriculture.

D.C., January 10, 1978.

IIAgricultura1 Prices

ll
,

Washington,

8

Table 1.

Land
"Class

Cost of Production for 1977 for Selected Crops by Land Class with
Factors Added to Inflate Costs to 1978 and to Provide for a La nd Charge

Commodi ty

Uni ts

Per Unit
Cost Per
Cost for
Uni t- 1977 1978 (+8%)

Per Acre
Land
Charge

Production
Pe r Acre

Cost Per
Uni t for
1978 with
Land Charge

( do 11 a rs )

~dO 11 a rs)

Crans )

(dollars)

( do 11 a rs )

I

Alfalfa

Ton

35.64

38.49

er acre
144

II

A1fa 1fa

Ton

36.77

39.71

III

Alfalfa

Ton

40.86

IV

Alfalfa

Ton

I

Ba rl ey

II

4.5

70.49

120

4.0

69.71

44.13

104

3.0

78.80

44.48

48.04

88

2.5

83.24

Bu

1 .34

1 .45

144

90.0

3.05

Ba rl ey

Bu

1 .43

1 .54

120

80.0

3.04

III

Ba r1 ey

Bu

1 .62

1 .75

104

65.0

3.35

IV

Ba rl ey

Bu

1 .87

2.02

88

50.0

3.78

I

Grain Corn

Bu

1 .35

1.46

144

"14·0.0

2.49

II

Grain Corn

Bu

1.55

1.67

120

"1 00.0

2.87

I

Corn Silage

Ton

11 . 16

12.05

144

20.0

19.25

II

Corn Silage

Ton

11 .55

12.47

120

18.0

19. 14
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Certain problems arise in this situation.

Young farmers find they

cannot buy land, farm it, and payout on their investment.

In many cases,

the American dream of climbing the agricultural ladder to ownership is
thwarted.

On the other hand, if prices" and incomes are boosted to where

there is a substantial return to land in farming, there is some reason to
expect a further bidding up of land prices to where again there is a low
imputed return to land.

Much of the contention on whether incomes and

return in agr'iculture are adequate revolves around the question of how
returns on the land investment are handled.

As an illustrat i on, assume as

in Table 1 that Class I irrigated land is selling at $1,800 per acre
(Class II, III, and IV are assumed to be worth $1,500, $1,300, and $1,100,
respectively).
grown.

On the Class I land, 90 bushels per acre of barley can be

Costs of production other than for land are about $"'.45 per bushel.

If interest on the land is 8 percent, the investment cost is $144 per acre
(1800 X 0.08).

For each bushel, the land charge would be $1.60.

the cost of production of barley, $1.45 or $3.05 per bushel?
goal on land ownership?

What is

What is our

Is it desirable to further push up land prices?

These are unanswered questions.

Certainly, there is a point that a young

or beginning farmer must have returns to land in order to buy land.

Govern-

ment rate allowances for regulated public utilities certainly provide for a
return to fixed investment regardless of whether their value is inflating.
As further evidence on cost of production in the Western States, a
Wyoming bulletin lists the costs of producing dryland wheat including a
land charge as $3.29, $3.77, $4.53 for production of 30, 25 , and 20 bushels
per acre, respectively . .§! These are values for 1975-76.

These, too, are

~D. E. Agee. IICosts of Producing Dryland Winter Wheat on Summer
Fallow, Southeastern Wyoming, 1975-76 11 , Bulletin 634, Exten~, io·n Services,
University of Wyoming, November 1975, p. 13.
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subject to inflation of 8 percent per year, or an increase to $3.85, $4.41,
and $5.30, respectively.

The middle value of $4.41 would reflect the

average production of 25 bushels per acre.
In an Oregon bulletin, which also includes a land charge, the 1976
cost is cited as $4.03 per bushel for dryland wheat.

Again applying the

cost of inflation to bring this to the current year, the cost would be
$4.72 per bushel.§!
Comparison of these examples of costs, the current parity prices, and
the current market prices for commodities is in Table 2.
larly the discrepancy in grain prices and costs.

Note particu-

Livestock prices are

also a problem which leads to the general situation of low farm incomes .

.§/Cook, Gordon H. and A. Gene Nelson. "Estimated Whea t Production and
Marketing Costs in a 2,000-Acre Dryland Farm, Oregon Columbia Plateau,
1976", Oregon State University Extension Service, November -1976, p. 5.
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Table 2.

Comparison of Costs, Parity, and Selling Price for Selected
Corrmodities
Current
Selling
Price

Crop

Unit

January 1978
Parity

All Wheat

Bu.

$ 5.00

Barley

Bu.

3.08

2.02 9

3.10

Corn

Bu.

3.49

2.4~

2.68

Hay (Baled)

Ton

56.0~

73.00

l8.83i!

19.20

Corn 5i 1age Ton

$ 2.7rft1

70.60 (a 11 hay)
NA

Example Costs with
Land C arge Included~

$ 4.60

~Estimated from preceding data.
Q/#l Hard Red Winter Wheat, Average Protein, at Ogden, Utah ., as of February
22, 1978. Source: Utah-Idaho Grain Exchange, Ogden, Utah.
9#2 Barley, 46 lbs. or over at Ogden, Utah, as of February 22, 1978.
Q/Average price for 1977 in Utah.
Salt Lake City, Utah.

USDA, Statistical Report -ing Service,

!VAlfalfa hay baled January 1978. USDA, Statistical Report-ing Service,
Agricultural Prices, January 31, 1978, p. 13.
flEstimated from feeding value and hay price.
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Solutions to the Farm Problem
The government could step in with price support payments to make up
the price difference.
farmers.
price.

This might involve direct government paymen t s to

It may be identified as a non-recourse loan at some target
If the grower finds the market price below the loan rate, he

turns the crop over to the government.
a larger stock.

The government thus accumulates

The main objection is usually the government progY'am

cost and the complaint that the payments go to large growers.

Further-

more, if price support payments (target prices, loan rates, or whatever)
are raised significantly, the country faces the almost certain problem of
unwieldy surpluses as well as continuing costly payments to farms.

Another

option is to disregard commodities altogether and simply make direct income
payments to fanners.

This is a lot simpler and no more

expE~nsive,

but

generally held to be politically untenable.
The second option is to work on inc r easing demand.
represents a new level of demand.
will be taken than before.

In Figure 3, DID'

At any given price, a laY'ger quantity

The price is forced up to the target at a

larger quantity of use than formerly.

The very great foreign demand for

grains in 1974 was an example of the expanded demand and favorable price.
Numerous programs, such as food stamps, school lunch subsidies, and other
related attempts have sought to increase demand.

These programs have met

with only limited success at best as far as expanding farm markets is concerned.

The basic reason is the inelas t icity of the human stomach.

vast majority of Americans have ample food.

Some diet changes would be

advisable, but demand expansion is severely limited.
had in attempts of expanding foreign demand.

The

More success has been

Around the world, bellies are

not full, but the countries where people are hungry are the same places

13

0'

~

Price

S

P

\

0'

o

s
Quantity
Figure 3.

Increased Demand for Ag r icultural Commodity.

where they cannot afford t o buy food.

Programs in the past (P. L. 480)

have sought to combine demand expansion with a price support program.
Subsidized sales or gifts to poor countries were used to meet the twin
objectives of feeding the starving and using up our own surpluses.
Interestingly enough, recipient countries have not always been too pleased
with receiving commodities, even as gifts, because of the uncertainty of
continued availability and the tendency for local agricultural systems to
relax when food is not critically short.

Other countries producing for

cash export markets have also complained of dumping and price undercutt i ng.
On balance, it seems prudent to have a stockpile which can be drawn on for
emergency donations for short-term disasters.

Other forms of help, such as

technical assistance and loans, seem more suited to the development process.
Certainly, it seems useful to attempt to develop stable and effective cash
markets.
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A third option for effecting changes in price is to con t rol supply.
In Figure 4, SIS' represents a new level of decreased supply .
given price, a smaller quantity will be produced.

At any

Due to the relatively

inelastic demands for many agricultural commodities (that is a relatively
large change in price is associated with a relatively smaller proportional
change in quantity), a small adjustment in supply quantity often provides
a substantia-' price change.
have taken place.

Numerous efforts of voluntary supply control

Killing baby pigs, not planting part of the acres,

dumping milk, etc. have seldom, if ever, gotten beyond the publicity stage .
The reasons for the ineffectiveness of voluntary actions lie in the large
number of producers whose financial capacities to withhold vary widely,
whose commitment to a cause vary widely, and whose bankers have varying
degrees of sympathy with the program
the terms of loans.

but a certain insistence on meeting

There just is not the incentive to ind -ividuals to

stick to a voluntary program where others can stand to gain more than the
withholder if the non-participant goes right ahead with ful l production.
D

Price
$

S
--------~~------------~~-----P

D

Figure 4.

Quantity
Reduced Supply for Agricultural Commodity.

The Conservation Reserve, Acreage Reserve, set-aside, and other programs have sought to control supply.

A major problem is the tendency for

poorest acreage to be diverted or set aside, and water, fet'tilizer, and
other production inputs concentrated on remaining acreage so that production is not much affected.

Most such programs have had a 90vernment payment

for the land taken out of production.

This has usually evoked adverse

comments on IIpayments for not producing ll and a general wavp of antagonism.
A further possibility for supply control is to control imports.
option has a lot of sympathetic supporters.

This

The difficulty is that restric-

tions on trade curb specialization and efficiency.

Other co untries cannot

buy our products unless they sell us some things for currency.

Some control

of wide fluctuations is at least warranted.
A current proposal is for a land reserve or set-aside that would control supply by requiring each producer to set aside a portion of his
acreage in proportion to the national potential production which is not
needed.

There would be no government payment, only the supply contraction

would support prices.
compliance.

The government would only be charged with enforcing

This would create some problems such as various schemes to

cheat on the system.

But,

Congress and others.

Although consumers would be hit with slightly higher

ov~rall

the system should have appeal to the

food prices, the government program cost could be fairly small.

Consumer

costs will be discussed later.
In review, the basic options for a solution to the problem are few.
There can be government price or income supports.
expansion, or there can be supply contraction.

Or, there can be demand

There is no magic.

The

government cannot, without cost, make a declaration which cures the problem.
There is no easy way out.

There are some hard ways out .

Basic under-

standing of the foregoing should help us to avoid these pitfalls.
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Some Truths and Some Errors
Farmers "deserve" 100 percent of parity.
equity, or efficiency for this contention.

There is no basis in history,

The original par y concept was

to compare receipts from farming with costs of production based on the
average levels of costs and income for each commodity in the period 1910-14.
Revisions have been attempted in the base period, but the problems remain.
The methods of production change; the economies of scale increase in importance and the comparison is no longer valid.

A farm price of product and

inputs is measured, but no mention is made of the greatly
that a single producer can generate.

creased volume

And, parity ignores t e changes in

quantities of various inputs purchased by a farmer.

Thus, t hey measure

only a compar'ison of prices for an outdated set of factors of production
and prices of commodities produced.

Perhaps a more useful concept would be

a measure of parity or equitability of incomes

~

farmer w'ith other occupa-

tions as of right now.
An increase of farm prices to 100 percent of parity would cause an
inflation rate of 6, 8, or 10 percent per year.
have made such statements.

It seems impossible.

increase would be a one-time event.

Some high-placed analysts
In the first place, an

Thus, it is not a rate of inflation

which implies a repetitive annual increment to the problem.

A one-time

rise in prices for farm products would result in the same expenditure by
consumers buying fewer goods, or a larger expenditure to buy the same goods.
This by definition is a price inflation, but it is a one-time occurrence.
Now, how much would this one-time inflation amount to? Take the following
figures.

Parity on the average is about 66 percent.

of the consumer food dollar is about 35 percent.

The farmer's share

Consumers spend about 18

17

percent of their income on food.

Thus, the price rise at the farm would

be about 50 percent (from 66 to 100 percent).

The appropriate estimate

of inflation (as measured by Consumer Price Index) is 0.50 X 0.35 X 0.18 =
0.032, or a one-time 3 percent increment that would be attributable to a

very large increase in farm prices.
There would be a large decline in gross national product and \l/isespread unemployment if farm prices were increased sharply.

Apparently,

there has been a case of neglect or forgetfulness by some analysts.
Clearly, a boost in agricultural incomes would result in increases in
employment and in expenditures and investments by the farm

This

~;ector.

increase would be magnified by the multiplied effect of these farm input
suppliers making further investments and expenditures.

Our evidence is

that farm sector expenditure multipliers are as high or higher than anywhere else in the economy.

Thus, we would expect that decreases in economic

activity due to a fall in expenditures in non-farm goods would be offset by
an increase in economic activity associated with agriculture.
Consumers object to any increase in food prices.
tions that consumers have a lot of sympathy for farmers

There are indicaI

plight.

But the

support is limited depending on the extent of impact on the consumer
pocketbook.

In Table 3, the results show general sympathy; but when con-

sumer costs are increased up to 10 percent, then the support wanes.

Of

course, any raise to as much as 100 percent of parity could be expected to
increase food costs by more than 10 percent.

According to our earlier

calculations, it would be about 17 percent (0.50 X 0.35 = 0.17).

Of

course, the usual pattern is for the marketing channels to tack on a

con~

stant percentage, but lack of a competitive system in the marketing can1t
be assessed to farmers.

Table 3.

Public Support for Raising Farm Prices Depending on the Effect on Food Price to Consumers
Political Philosophy
Total

Conservative

Middle
of road

Liberal

Political Party
Democrat

Republican

Independent

Voted For
Ford

Carter

68.7
22.2
9.1

74.0
15.5
10.5

56.8
36.5
6.7

52.8
35.2
12.0

20.7
71 .9
7.3

17.4
68.1
14.5

Would you favor giving farmers 100% of parity if that enabled them to make ends meet?
Favor
Oppose
Not sure

73.6
15.4
10.9

72.3
18.8
8.9

73.0
15.7
11 .3

76.1
13.9
9.9

76.6
12. 1
11 .3

71. 8
18.8

9.4

71 .3 '
19.7
9.0

Would you favor giving the farmers 100% of parity if that raised your food costs 5%?
Favor
Oppose
Not sure

53.7
35.7
10.6

53.2
37.2
9.6

55.3
33.7
11 .0

53.2
36.4
10.4

50.6
37.8
11 .6

58.6
31 .7
9.7

56.7
34.6
8.7

Would you favor giving the farmers 100% of parity if that raised your food costs 10%?
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
Source:

19.2
68.3
12.6

18.8
68.1
13. 1

17.6
69.7
12.7

22.8
66.7
10.5

16.2
71.8
12.0

22.7
64.9
12.4

19.5
67.7
12.8

Louis Harris and Associates Poll of 1259 respondents quoted in Doane's Agricultural Report,
Vol. 41 No. 8-1 t February 24, 1978.

co
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So the question of public support is met with a mixed reaction for
answer.

No conclusion is definite on how a Congress might react.

Only

can it be said that agriculture seems to have more support than has been
the case some times in the past.
Some Final Comments
A few things seem to be evident in reviewing goals and the nature of
the problems and possible solutions.
1.

We would list the fol lowing:

It would be prudent and useful to establish a stockpile which

would not be regarded as burdensome surplus, but as a useful buffer and
insurance.
2.

This can be afforded.

Farmers are in difficulty.

problem at all.

Some worse than

others ~,

a few have no

But, the general situation is that they have done their

job so well for us all (and due to the nature of the industry), they have
dug a pit for themselves.

We assert that some help is warranted to main-

tain a stable and lively industry.
3.

Various forms of help are possible.

We think it advisable to

minimize direct government payments while facilitating a mechanism of
supply control.

However, farmers themselves, because of their large num-

ber, cannot manage this in a voluntary way.
4.

The productive capacity of agriculture is too great to let -it go

unleashed.

Too many will suffer from the great burdens of overproduction.

There will be too great a risk of the system's self-destructing.

Agricul-

ture cannot compete unfettered in an economy where other sectors can manage
production.
5.

Demand expansion has little potential.

worthwhile, but this is not the basic solution.

Continued efforts may be
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6.

Parity is a poor measure of equity to agricul t ure.

very useful.

It is not

It seems evident that an increase of price of agricu l tural

commodities to 100 percent of parity wou l d create too urgent of signals
for the system to produce more.

Land values would be infla ted.

It

would also cause consumer protest, although the effect on consumer expenditures would be less than some would have us believe.
7.

We suggest a program designed to bring agricultural incomes up

only part way to what would be implied by the advocates of lOa percent of
parity.

An immediate sharp increase all the way to parity \,a/ould cause

too much stress in the livestock industry and to consumers.
8.

Probably none of us would choose to have even infrequent serious

shortages of food in preference to over-production problems.

Let us take

appropriate steps to stabilize and provide for a viable, long-term productive agriculture.
needed.

Legislation of help to agriculture is immediately

